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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob  Juan  Hernandez,  Jr.,  appeals  from  the  district  court’s  Judgment  of  Commitment.
Mr. Hernandez was charged with one count of second degree murder, two counts of aggravated
battery, and two counts of second degree kidnapping for his alleged involvement in a gang
related fight that broke out on December 24, 2014, and for hopping into a vehicle, driven by two
women, to obtain a ride from the area of the altercation.  Following a trial, he was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated battery, and two counts of second degree
kidnapping.
Mr. Hernandez raised six issues in his Appellant’s Brief.  He asserted that the district
court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to support his convictions for second degree kidnapping and that the district court erred
in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motions for judgments of acquittal, that his statutory right
to a speedy trial was violated when the district court denied his motion to dismiss the two
aggravated battery and two second degree kidnapping charges, that it was an abuse of discretion
for  the  district  court  to  allow the  admission  State’s  Exhibit  11,  a  video  from the  body cam of
Officer Robbins, that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
payment of co-counsel, and that these errors amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his
right to a fair trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous assertions that the
introduction of Sergeant Hoadley’s testimony regarding a shooting at David Prieto’s
grandmother’s home did not affect Mr. Hernandez’ right to a fair trial because the district court’s
instructions  to  the  jury  were  sufficient  to  cure  the  potential  prejudice;  that  the  State  presented
2sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hernandez actually seized and/or detained the alleged
kidnapping victims at or before entering their vehicle; that there was no speedy trial violation
because the statutory time limits ran from the later filed Superseding Indictment, not the
Information, that there was good cause for any delay, and that any delay was harmless; and that
any abuse of discretion in denying the payment of co-counsel was harmless.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Hernandez’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
3ISSUES1
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Hernandez’ motion for a mistrial?
2. Should this Court vacate Mr. Hernandez’ convictions for second degree kidnapping
because there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions?
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hernandez’ Motion to Dismiss due to a
violation of his right to a speedy trial?
4. Did  the  district  court  abuse  its  discretion  when it  admitted  State’s  Exhibit  11,  the  body
cam video from Officer Erica Robbins, because the video’s limited probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect?
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hernandez’ motion for
payment of co-counsel?
6. Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Hernandez’ Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?
1 This Reply Brief will not address Mr. Hernandez’ issues four and six as the State’s arguments
on these issues are unremarkable and, as such, do not require any further argument.  In this brief,
argument  on  issue  five,  will  be  made  under  issue  heading  four,  as  issue  four  will  not  be
addressed in this Reply Brief.
4ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Hernandez’ Motion For A Mistrial
The State has asserted that Sergeant Hoadley’s testimony regarding a shooting at David
Prieto’s grandmother’s home “did not affect Hernandez’s right to a fair trial” because the district
court’s instructions to the jury were sufficient to cure the potential prejudice.  (Respondent’s
Brief, p.11.) Mr. Hernandez maintains that the testimony was incredibly prejudicial and likely
had a continuing impact on the trial, and the district court’s failure to declare a mistrial was
reversible error.
A. The Testimony Was Improper
The State has first asserted that “nothing about the state’s question or Sergeant Hoadley’s
answer was actually improper.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.14.)  The State supports this assertion by
arguing that defense counsel’s questioning of Sergeant Hoadley, regarding the actual threat
presented to gang members who cooperate with the police, was “an attempt to undermine the
credibility of several state’s witnesses.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.14.)  This is an exaggeration of
the effect of defense counsel’s questioning.  The State presented testimony that retaliation can
and does occur.  (Tr., p.1187, L.5 – p.1189, L.12.)  Defense counsel asked about the frequency of
retaliation versus the perceived threat of retaliation. (Tr., p.1210, L.11 – p.1211, L.15.)  As such,
none of the State’s evidence about whether or not retaliation does occur was challenged by
defense counsel’s limited questioning.
Further, the purpose of defense counsel’s questioning was not to elicit testimony to
undermine witnesses, but was to ensure that the jury was provided with accurate information
regarding retaliation.  Prior to cross examination, the jury was presented testimony that there are
5“very serious consequences” for snitching such as being beaten up, family members’ homes
being “shot up”, and even death.  (Tr., p.1188, L.23 – p.1189, L.7.)  The State asked specifically
whether the threats were “empty threats.”  (Tr., p.1189, L.11.)  Sergeant Hoadley responded that
they were not.   (Tr., p.1189, L.12.)  Without defense counsel’s questioning, the jury would have
been left with one-sided information that implied that retaliation was a foregone conclusion.  It
was not until defense counsel clarified, with a few questions, that there was a lot of intimidation
in  regards  to  retaliation  for  snitching  and  that  “it  could  go  either  way”  in  terms  of  actual
retaliation.  (Tr., p.1210, L.11 – p.1211, L.15.)
Even if the cross-examination touched on credibility, it did not open the door to all
possible evidence regarding retaliation.  The State has argued, as they did unpersuasively to the
district court, that the testimony was necessary to rebut a presumption that retaliation “doesn’t
happen as often as these witnesses think it might happen, so their testimony is not as credible on
that score.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.15; Tr., p.1222, Ls.18-20.)  However, the improper
testimony was not necessary to rehabilitate witnesses or to disprove testimony presented on
cross-examination.   While retaliation may not occur as often as a gang member might believe, it
was made clear during cross-examination that the gang members “truly believe” that they will be
killed for snitching.  (Tr., p.1211, Ls.1-11)  As such, whether retaliation will actually occur is
irrelevant  because,  for  the  State’s  purposes,  it  is  only  what  the  witnesses  believed  that  would
impact their credibility.
Additionally, the State had already successfully made its point about the dangers of
retaliation.  As noted previously, the State had presented testimony that Sergeant Hoadley had
personally “seen family’s houses get shot up.”  (Tr., p.1189, Ls.3-7.)  And, on redirect again
6reiterated that retaliation is “a real concern” and that it does happen in this area.  (Tr., p.1218,
Ls.5-10.)   The State then took it one question too far by asking:
Q.   And  you  are  familiar  with  a  shooting  that  happened  Sunday  night  at  David
Prieto’s grandmother’s house?
A.  Yes.
(Tr., p.1218, Ls.11-14.)  This testimony did not merely provide “a real word example,” but was
wholly unnecessary testimony that targeted Mr. Hernandez.  It was clearly inadmissible evidence
that was highly prejudicial.  The trial court recognized that the danger of the evidence was more
than “potentially prejudicial” when it noted that, while discussing the inference that
Mr. Hernandez was involved, “the prejudice to the Defendant . . . outweighs the probative
value.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.15; Tr., p.1223, Ls.12-15.)
B. The District  Court’s Instruction To Ignore The Evidence Was Insufficient To Cure The
Prejudice To Mr. Hernandez
While a curative instruction can be an effective remedy, an instruction can also be an
insufficient remedy. State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 767–68 (Ct. App. 2012).  “[T]here are
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great,
and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations
of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
Mr. Hernandez asserts that his is such a case.  The evidence erroneously presented to the jury
was  so  prejudicial  that  mere  statement,  “[f]olks,  I’m  going  to  instruct  you  to  ignore  that  last
comment.  All right?” (Tr., p.1218, Ls.21-23), could not cure the error.
As noted in the Appellant’s Brief, it was especially damning for the jury to hear
information about presumably real retaliation, after hearing significant testimony about
retaliation concerns.  This evidence drew important testimony to a tipping point and lead to only
7one  conclusion:  David  Prieto  was  credible  and  Mr.  Hernandez  was  guilty.   After  all,  no
reasonable  juror  would  believe  that  the  shooting  and  the  case  at  hand  were  not  related.   Even
with the instruction to ignore the evidence, the jury was likely unable to put the prejudicial
thought – why retaliate if he is not guilty – out of their mind.  In effect, no jury would be able to
ignore the evidence.
C. The Failure To Grant A Mistrial Is Not Harmless
Mr. Hernandez asserts that the failure to grant a mistrial was not harmless.  Error is
harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209
(2010).
The State has asserted that the “stricken testimony was harmless because the State
presented overwhelming evidence of guilt.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.18.)  The State has misstated
the harmless error standard.  The Court does not look to whether there is “overwhelming
evidence of guilt,” but whether the testimony contributed to the verdict.  Mr. Hernandez asserts
that the testimony did contribute to the verdict.
As noted above, the testimony was exceeding prejudicial.  Further, evidence of
Mr.  Hernandez’  alleged  guilt  was  based  primarily  on  the  testimony  of  gang  members  or  their
associates.  As was noted by the State’s witness, Sergeant Hoadley, gang members cannot
always be trusted to tell the truth; they lie to protect the gang, out of revenge, to personally
benefit, and to protect others.  (Tr., p.1212, L.12 – p.1213, L.7.)  The jury could only find
Mr. Hernandez guilty of the homicide or batteries by believing the testimony of gang members
and their associates.  Their testimony was bolstered by the testimony of a more reliable witness,
Sergeant Hoadley, who testified that retaliation had in fact occurred when David Prieto’s
8grandmother’s home was shot at the night before Mr. Hernandez’ trial began.  There is little
doubt that this testimony had an impact on the jury’s determination.
Further, the State has argued that the testimony was brief and buried in a seven-day trial.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.16.)  Presumably, the State is implying that because the erroneous
testimony involved only a few words, during one witness’s testimony, there is little concern that
it could implicate Mr. Hernandez’ right to a fair trial.  To make such a suggestion is absurd.  The
right to fair trial is a right to a fair trial from start to finish.  Whether the erroneous testimony is
limited in words used or actual time presented has no bearing on whether the evidence is so
egregious that it interferes with a constitutional right.   This Court looks to the continuing impact
of the incident that triggered the motion, not the mere amount of time it took to present the
erroneous testimony. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
Based upon the highly prejudicial nature of the testimony and its likely impact on the
verdict, Mr. Hernandez asserts that the failure to grant a mistrial was not harmless and amounted
to a denial of his right to a fair trial.
II.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Hernandez’ Convictions For Second Degree Kidnapping Because
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Convictions
The State has asserted that “[b]y stopping Amanda and Michelle as they were driving
away, Hernandez necessarily ‘seized’ them or, at the very least, temporarily ‘detained’ them
from departing” and that “the evidence clearly shows Hernandez actually seized and/or detained
the women at or before the time he entered their vehicle.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.26-27.)  The
State’s argument that Mr. Hernandez had seized the women, even prior to entering their vehicle,
is unpersuasive and its application leads to absurd results.
9Contrary to the State’s assertion, every momentary interference with a person going
about their business is not a seizure or temporary detention.  If all that was required to prove a
seizure or detention was that a person’s attention was diverted from their planned course of
activity, nearly every interaction with another human would satisfy this burden.  For a
kidnapping conviction, under the theories charged by the State in this case, the State has to prove
that an individual “seized and/or detained” another individual with the intent to “to cause [him or
her], without authority of law, to be in any way held to service and/or kept and/or detained
against [his or her] will.”  (R., pp.383, 386.)  As such, following the State’s logic, every time a
person  stops  an  individual  on  the  street  to  ask  the  time,  they  have  satisfied  the  elements  of
kidnapping:  they would have seized or temporarily detained the person to ask a question,
diverting them from their previously planned course of action, with the intention of holding them
to service (i.e. serving them by providing information).  Of course, one would have to assume
that the individual was not happy to provide that person with the time, an assumption similar to
the one that the State has made in regards to the facts of this case.  Simply, the State’s asserted
standard for what constitutes a seizure or detention is impractical, illogical, and not supported by
law.
For law enforcement purposes, the typical standard for a seizure or detention has been
identified by the Supreme Court:
When police attempt to question a person who is walking down the street . . . , it
makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable person would feel free to continue
walking.  But when the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the
degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not
an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.
. . . In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.
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Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991).  Mr. Hernandez acknowledges that this
standard has not been applied specifically to the seizure requirement of kidnapping, but he
asserts that it is helpful in determining what conduct is necessary for a seizure.  Surely, a seizure
requires more than a mere limited interference with an individual’s planed course of activities, as
the State suggests.
In the case at hand, Mr. Hernandez and another individual were clearly seeking a ride.
This was evidenced by the undisputed fact that Mr. Hernandez asked for a ride. (Tr., p.637, L.25
– p.638, L.1.)  The act of asking must play a significant role in determining Mr. Hernandez’
intent.  Under any normal kidnapping fact pattern, the accused would not ask the individual if
they were willing participate in an activity which might be construed as being held to service,
kept, or detained against their will, but would insist on participation or acquiescence.  Making a
request is strong evidence that Mr. Hernandez did not intent to hold the women to service against
their will.  Further, while he did not wait for an answer before hoping into the van (Tr., p.614,
Ls.7-9), that action alone does not prove that the women were not free to decline the ride or to
ask Mr. Hernandez to get out of the van.  In fact, the evidence shows that they did feel free to do
just that when, after a few minutes, the women asked the young men to get out.  (Tr., p.626,
Ls.11-17.)   Both men exited when asked and thanked the women for the ride.  (Tr., p.626, L.18
– p.627, L.1, p.651, Ls.1-8, p.651, Ls.7-24.)
As such, the logical conclusion is that providing a ride was either a consensual act or that,
at a minimum, it was consensual from Mr. Hernandez’ point of view.  Either view would prove
that he did not have the requisite intent for kidnapping.  Obviously, jumping into a vehicle and
demanding that a person drive to a specific location is far different than jumping into a vehicle
11
while asking for a ride and saying thank you when asked to leave prior to reaching the desired
location.  One may amount to kidnapping, and the other cannot.
Finally, the State has asserted that there was additional evidence that supported the
inference that Mr. Hernandez intended to detain the women or hold them to his service.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.28.)  None of the referenced evidence (that Mr. Hernandez allegedly
participated in the earlier stabbings, that he wanted to leave the area quickly, and that he initially
claimed to have left the area in a taxi2) lend any actual support to an inference of nefarious intent
in regards to kidnapping.  It merely shows alleged involvement in earlier criminal activities and
that he had a desire to leave the area.  He clearly intended to try to obtain a ride, but the evidence
does not infer that his intent was to do so in any way possible, including resorting to kidnapping.
Again, the actual evidence in this case, Mr. Hernandez’ actions, exiting as soon as requested and
saying thank you, show that he was not a desperate individual who would do anything to get to
his intended location.  This is especially true because Mr. Hernandez did not even reach his
intended location. (Tr., p.616, L.2 – p.617, L.15.)
Mr. Hernandez maintains that the State failed to prove that any actual seizure or detention
of the women occurred or that Mr. Hernandez had the intent to commit second degree
kidnapping.  Because the State failed to present substantial and competent evidence that proved,
2 The State has implied that Mr. Hernandez’ response to police, admitting that the women did not
invite him into the vehicle, carries weight to prove intent.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.28 (citing
State’s Exhibit 77: DVD10_Redacted.mpg).)  However, a lack of invitation does not show that
Mr. Hernandez was intending to force the women to provide him with a ride.  It would be very
unusual for women and children to drive around calling out to individuals in the night offering
rides.  The fact that the events of that evening did not include such odd behavior does not have
any bearing on Mr. Hernandez’ intent.  Further, Mr. Hernandez asserts that the video of his
conversation with police shows how upset he was at the suggestion that he had kidnapped
anyone and he can be heard reiterating over and again that he asked for a ride and believed that
he had received permission.  (State’s Exhibit 77: DVD10_Redacted.mpg.)
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beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Hernandez committed two counts of second degree
kidnapping, this Court must vacate his convictions.
III.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hernandez’ Motion To Dismiss Due To A
Violation Of His Right To A Speedy Trial
A. The District Court Violated Mr. Hernandez’ Right To A Speedy Trial As Guaranteed By
Idaho Statute
I.C. § 19-3501(2) required the State to bring Mr. Hernandez to trial on the two aggravated
battery charges and the two second degree kidnapping charges within in six months of the filing
of  the  Information.   The  Information  was  never  dismissed  and,  as  a  result,  the  speedy  trial
requirement was not altered.  The State violated I.C. § 19-3501(2) when it failed to bring
Mr. Hernandez to trial within six months.
1.  Under Idaho Code § 19-3501 Mr. Hernandez’ Speedy Trial Time Limitations Ran
From The Filing Of The Information, Not The Superseding Indictment
The State has asserted that “[b]ecuase Hernandez’ trial commenced within six months of
his arraignment on the charges in the Superseding Indictment, Hernandez has failed to show any
violation of his statutory speedy trial rights.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.31.)  This argument fails to
recognize the significance of the previously filed Information.  The State appears to argue that
because an indictment was filed, the Information and the statutory speedy trial rights attached
thereto, vanish for all purposes of legal significance.  The State provides no authority to support
this assertion. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).  Mr. Hernandez maintains that the
Information cannot merely be disregarded.
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The State then asserted that Mr. Hernandez “asks this Court to ignore the plain language
of I.C. § 19-3501(3)” when evaluating the statutory speedy trial limits.  (Respondent’s Brief,
p.31.)  Contrary to the State’s assertion, Mr. Hernandez did not ask this Court to ignore I.C. § 19-
3501(3).  Instead, he requested this Court find that the time limits involved ran from the filing of
the Information and that it apply I.C. § 19-3501(2); a request consistent with Idaho Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals precedent, stating that the six month speedy trial time limit is not
renewed  unless  the  original  charges  are  dismissed  and  re-filed.   [State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho
619, 627 (Ct. App. 2001)]; State v. Horsley, 117 Idaho 920, 926 (1990); State v. Goodmiller, 86
Idaho 233, 235 (1963).
2. The State Failed To Show Good Cause For The Delay
The State has asserted that the evolution of the case caused by the addition of a murder
charge and the need to further investigate, including obtaining DNA test results amounted to
good cause.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.36-38.)  This argument fails for several reasons.
First, the district court did not find good cause to delay past the speedy trial deadline.
The district court’s findings that there was good cause to delay the trial was based upon the idea
that the trial would be held within the statutory speedy trial limits.  (Tr., 4/30/15, p.17, Ls.11-22.)
While the district court assumed that the speedy trial requirement ran from the filing of the
Superseding Indictment for purposes of the current hearing, the district court had not yet
definitively determined whether the statutory speedy trial requirements ran from the filing of the
information or superseding indictment and specifically requested briefing on that issue “as soon
as possible.”  (Tr. 4/30/15, p.8, Ls.18-23, p.26, Ls.1-18.)  Therefore, the district court did not rule
that the State’s motion presented good cause to delay the trial outside of the speedy trial limit.
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Further, the evolution of the case did not provide for good cause to delay the trial.  The
State asserted that “nothing required the state . . . to conduct two separate trials.  In fact, had the
court denied the state’s request for a continuance, the state would have been well within its right
to dismiss and re-file all of the charges, thus resetting the statutory speedy trial clock.”
(Respondent’s Brief,  p.37.)   The State seems to forget that  a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
could require that the State conduct two separate trials.   The argument that the State could have
dismissed the charges to reset speedy trial limits is equally unpersuasive as it highlights how
easily the State could have conducted a trial within speedy trial limits by merely seeking
dismissal of the Information.  However, the State did not seek to dismiss the Information and, as
a result, it was bound to the speedy trial limitations it placed upon itself for the battery and
kidnapping charges.  Further, when the State sought an additional continuance, for the same
DNA evidence, it did not dismiss and re-file.  Instead, the case proceeded to trial as scheduled.
Additionally, the State’s request for a continuance was not based upon the evolution of
the case or need to investigate other than the specific request for time to collect additional
evidence related to the DNA testing and other blood evidence.  Although the motion notes that
the “investigation is ongoing” it also specifically refers to the DNA testing.  (R., p.101.)  When
the  district  court  began  discussion  of  the  motion  it  noted  “[a]nd  the  basis  for  the  motion,  as  I
understand it, is that the evidence is not back from the lab.”  (Tr. 4/30/15, p.14, Ls.17-19.)  The
State’s response was “[y]es” and only noted that they were also looking as some blood smears
found on some other items.  (Tr. 4/30/15, p.14, Ls.21-24.)  As such, the only evidence mentioned
as  grounds  for  the  continuance  was  already  in  the  State’s  possession  or  control  at  that  time.
Because the State failed to assert that the collection of any other evidence provided grounds for
the  motion,  such  an  assumption  cannot  be  made  for  the  first  time  several  years  later.    If  a
15
continuance was necessary for additional reasons, the State should have presented those reasons
to the district court.
Finally, the State did not disclose the complete information about the DNA testing to
Judge  Huskey  at  the  hearing  on  the  motion  for  continuance.   The  State  only  revealed  the
information about its own negligence in submitting the evidence for DNA testing at the
September 23, 2015, motion for continuance hearing.  At this hearing, the State admitted that
although the knife was collected nearly four months earlier, it was not received by the state lab
until April 14, 2015, and that it was not sent off sooner because everyone incorrectly assumed
that the police department had already sent it to the lab.  (Tr. 9/23/16, p.7, L.16 – p.8, L.5, p.11,
Ls.14-23.)   Although the prosecution had already discovered that the knife had been sitting for
nearly four months and had only been sent to the lab two weeks prior, it chose to not disclose this
information to Judge Huskey when she was tasked with determining whether or not there was
good cause to delay the trial at the April 30, 2015, hearing.  It is notable that once this
information was revealed and a district court had the opportunity to specifically address the
issue, the district court denied the motion for a further continuance, finding that there was not
good cause.  (Tr. 9/23/15, p.13, L.6.)
3. The  Violation  Of  Mr.  Hernandez’  Statutory  Speedy  Trial  Right  Was  Not
Harmless
The  State  has  asserted  that  “any  error  in  the  court’s  decision  to  continue  the  trial  was
harmless.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.39.)  Mr. Hernandez asserts the violation cannot be harmless
because a harmless error standard in not applied to speedy trial violations.  In State v. Stuart, 113
Idaho 494, 497 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals found that because there was no waiver of
the  right  to  a  speedy trial  and  there  was  not  good cause  shown for  the  delay,  the  judgment  of
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conviction must be reversed.  The Court did not engage in any harmless error analysis. Id.
Likewise, no harmless error analysis is conducted for constitutional speedy trial violations.  After
balancing the Barker factors, if there is a speedy trial violation, the remedy is dismissal:
The  amorphous  quality  of  the  right  [to  a  speedy  trial]  also  leads  to  the
unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has
been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a
defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been
tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a
new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).  As such, no harmless error test should be used by
this Court in evaluating the speedy trial violation.
Should this Court decide to apply a harmless error standard, the speedy trial violation
cannot be found to be harmless.  The State has asserted that if the district court had dismissed the
case, it would have simply re-filed the charges and that “his trial on the subsequently filed
Indictment rendered the alleged error harmless.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.39.)  This argument is
erroneous.
Error is harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).  If this Court finds the district court should have granted
Mr.  Hernandez’  motion  to  dismiss  the  error  would  not  be  harmless,  because  this  Court  would
have to find the district court should have dismissed the case.  Inevitably, the harm is the trial.
Therefore, a trial held in violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is unavoidably not
harmless.
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B. The District Court Violated Mr. Hernandez’ Right To A Speedy Trial As Guaranteed By
The United States And Idaho Constitutions
The majority of the State’s arguments regarding the constitutional speedy trial violation
are unremarkable and, as such, do not require any further argument.  However, the State has
asserted that there was a valid reason presented for the delay in the trial and adopts its earlier
arguments regarding a showing of good cause under the statutory speedy trial analysis.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.42.)  Mr. Hernandez specifically disputes this assertion and adopts the
arguments articulated in Section I(A)(2), supra, in support of his response.
IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Hernandez’ Motion For Payment Of
Co-Counsel
The State has conceded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize
that it had authority under I.C.R 12.2 to grant Mr. Hernandez’ request for payment of co-counsel;
yet, the State asserts that the abuse of discretion was harmless.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.52-53.)
Mr. Hernandez asserts that the district court’s abuse of discretion was not harmless.
The State claims, “Any abuse of discretion was harmless, however, because the denial of
the motion did not affect Hernandez’s substantial rights.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.52 (citing I.C.R.
52, State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363 (2010).)  The State continues, arguing that “there is
no evidence in the record to suggest, that the trial court’s failure to ‘address the merits’ of
Hernandez’s motion for payment of co-counsel in any way adversely affected [his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and] absent such evidence, it must be
presumed that Hernandez’s trial counsel preformed within the wide range of reasonable
profession [sic] assistance the Sixth Amendment requires.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.53.)  The
State’s assertion is that Mr. Hernandez had a duty to prove his Sixth Amendment right was
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violated.  This is a misrepresentation of the harmless error standard and is patently incorrect.
As the Idaho Supreme Court recognized, in Idaho the harmless error test articulated in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) is  used  for  all  objected-to  error,  “A defendant
appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish
that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).  As
such, the State must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
In order for the State to prove that the district court’s abuse of discretion was harmless, it
must show either that the district court would not have granted the motion had the court
recognized its discretion under I.C.R. 12.2 or the result of the trial would have been the same had
the district court allowed for the payment of co-counsel.  The State did not argue nor prove either
of these theories.
Furthermore, Mr. Hernandez asserts that the State could not prove harmlessness.  There is
no evidence that the district court would have denied the motion for payment of co-counsel.  Due
the district court’s failure to recognize its authority, there was no discussion as to the merits of the
motion.  (Tr. 9/1/15, p.4, L.2 – p.8, L.3.)  Additionally, Mr. Hernandez’ case is more complex
than an average case.  As was noted in the Ex-Parte Motion for Payment of Co-Counsel and
Notice of Hearing, counsel noted that Mr. Hernandez was proceeding to trial on five felony
counts, including first degree murder; that the State was intending to call 35 to 40 witnesses; at
least three witness would be experts; between 60 and 100 exhibits were planned for introduction;
the discovery included numerous audio and video recordings.  (Augmentation: Ex-Parte Motion
for Payment of Co-Counsel and Notice of Hearing.)  It is undeniable that co-counsel would have
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been of great assistance in preparing for and during trial.  It is impossible to ascertain whether this
additional assistance may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.
Therefore, the State failed to meet its burden to prove that the error was harmless.  And,
because the State has conceded that the district court abused its discretion, this Court must vacate
Mr. Hernandez’ convictions and remand the case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hernandez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his two kidnapping
convictions because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support these convictions.
Additionally, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand this case
for a new trial.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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